Completeness in abstract interpretation models the ideal situation where no loss of precision is introduced in computations by approximating concrete data by their abstractions. If we interpret the abstraction as the ability of an attacker to distinguish, i.e., observe, properties of public computations, and the computation as the concrete denotational semantics of the program, then the lack of precision, encoded in abstract interpretation as a lack of completeness, corresponds precisely to the leakage of information corresponding to a violated security policy. This correspondence allows us to inherit, in the field of language-based security, the whole theory and methodology for making abstract domains complete. In particular, we prove that an adjoint relation exists between the power of the attacker and the amount of the information released -the more the attacker can observe, the less information can be kept private. This characterisation is achieved by interpreting, in the security context, the standard adjoint transformations making an abstract domain complete by refining and simplifying abstractions.
Introduction
Many security problems in language-based security are problems of confidentiality: in order to keep some information confidential, a user states a policy stipulating that no data visible to other users is affected by confidential data [36] .
The standard way used to show confidentiality is to prove that an attacker cannot observe any difference between the public outputs of any two executions differing only in their private inputs, with the assumption that an attacker (or unauthorized user) is allowed to view only information that is not confidential.
computes accurately on the property. In general, the abstract interpretation framework guarantees that the abstract computation is sound, namely we can only lose information by computing on abstract properties. On the other hand, the accuracy of the computation is modelled in terms of completeness: an abstract domain is complete for a program if the computation of the program, on the abstract properties, corresponds precisely to the abstraction of the concrete computation. In other words, the abstract domain is as precise as possible with respect to the program to compute. For example, Sign is not complete for the integer addition: we cannot be precise when we compute the sign of the sum of a negative with a positive number, because the sign loses the magnitude of numbers. On the other hand, Par is complete for integer addition, because the parity domain contains all the information necessary to precisely determine the parity of the sum of two integers.
Abstract non-interference. Abstract non-interference aims to model the non-interference weakening processes in a single framework, and to provide techniques for characterising these weakenings. A deep analysis of the relations between abstract non-interference and most of these approaches can be found in [29, 16] .
In the example above, we can choose to abstract the input tables, and in particular the SSN, which is the attribute generating the flow of information. We can use the interval abstract domain (see Table 2 ), an abstraction associating with each integer the property of being included in a particular interval of values, e.g., Int(104) = [0, 300]. This abstraction weakens the association that an external observer can deduce by joining the two tables, since with each disease we may associate a set of patients 1 . Moreover, by abstracting the disease, for example distinguishing diseases with respect to the part of the body involved, we may further abstract the output tables, making even weaker the patient/disease association. The aim of these abstractions is that of allowing a controlled interference, that would be rejected in standard security contexts, but which might be acceptable in some environments where access to confidential information is essential, such as password checking or statistical database queries.
Contribution. In this paper, we interpret abstract non-interference in terms of abstract domain completeness. In abstract interpretation, completeness, means that no loss of precision is due to the abstract observation of a concrete computation. In non-interference, this loss of precision can be interpreted as a loss of confidential information, which flows from the program semantics to a malicious observation of the program. Namely, it means that the attacker can disclose more confidential information than what the non-interference policy permits. Consider the example above. In the concrete case ( Table 1) the abstract domain distinguishing all the diseases (modelling the fact that we protect the exact association patient/disease) is incomplete for the join operation, since by changing the disease associated with a patient, we change the resulting output table. Consider now the abstract tables in Table 2 and suppose we allow to flow the distinction between cancer and other diseases (for instance, we allow the fact that a patient has a cancer to flow, but we want to protect the information about the kind of cancer). Then the abstract domain modelling this situation is complete for the join operation, because even if we let the disease vary among the cancer types, the resulting table remains the same (Table 3) . Therefore there is not uncontrolled information leakage. Table 3 : The abstract join.
The completeness-based characterisation of non-interference is interesting since it allows us to exploit the whole abstract domain completeness theory [20] in the non-interference context. In particular, as we will see, each non-interference policy is completely characterised by the abstract domains considered in the particular completeness equation that characterises the policy to enforce. The first added value of interpreting abstract non-interference as a problem of abstract domain completeness is that it forces a distinction between two aspects of non-interference, strongly related but fundamentally different: the external observer (also called attacker) and the (confidential) information released. The abstract interpretation-based approach to non-interference provides an adequate framework where we can model these two aspects of non-interference, allowing us to study their relation. In fact, by characterizing the attacker and the protected information in the same model, we are able to formally prove the intuitive relation existing between attacker and released secrets: the more powerful the attacker is, the less information can be kept secret. In the database example, the attacker is the observation of the output table. If he/she is only able to observe properties of the different diseases or intervals of SSN, then
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The most concrete observer id ⊤ id Figure 1 : Observable vs observer his/her observation of the sensitive information is imprecise and, therefore, the flow can be considered acceptable. Indeed, the more abstract the observation of the output table is, the less precise is the sensitive information disclosed. It is exactly the completeness characterisation of abstract non-interference that provides the tools that lead to a formal description of this relation. In abstract non-interference [13] we can characterise both the strongest harmless observer, i.e., the most concrete observation unable to break security, and the maximal amount of information disclosed. In the completeness framework, these constructions correspond precisely to the well known abstract domain transformers, which minimally refine (shell) or simplify (core) a given domain in order to induce completeness [20] . We show that the adjoint relation between attacker and private information released precisely corresponds to the known completeness adjoint relation between shell, of the input domain, and core, of the output one [20] . In Fig. 1 we provide a graphical representation of the relation existing between the most concrete property modeling the public observer and the most abstract property modeling the private observable. In particular, this picture represents the fact that the more powerful the attacker is, i.e., the more concrete the observer property is, the less confidential information can be kept private, i.e., the more concrete the private observable is. The picture also shows that if the arrow represents the most abstract private observable, then, when we declassify a confidential property which lies in the white area, we cannot guarantee the secrecy of the program, since we are declassifying less than what is released by the semantics. When we declassify a property in the filled area instead, we guarantee that no confidential information leakage may happen. Moreover, note that even if the attacker is able to observe the value of public variables, then the observable property can be more abstract then the identity, since the program itself can behave as a firewall for certain confidential properties, for example the square operation hides the sign. Finally, we consider the problem of making an approximation complete from the point of view of transforming semantics instead of domains [17] . This is important since it means that we cannot characterise the most harmful input attacker, and similarly we cannot characterise the private information that a program semantics protects.
Revisiting dimensions. While introducing the completeness model of (abstract) non-interference, we underlined how this model forces a distinction between two aspects of non-interference, the attacker model and the information disclosed. We will call these two aspects respectively the observer side and the observable side of abstract non-interference. Even if we don't use the word dimension, the relation between these two aspects and the classification provided by Sabelfeld and Sands [39] is clear and needs some discussion.
Sabelfeld and Sands [39] propose a characterization of dimensions and principles which is a road map of the main definitions of weakening of non-interference, which they call generically declassifications. The main structure of their theory is based on the characterisation of which are the possible dimensions of declassification and which are the principles that a declassification policy may satisfy. In order to understand the difference between their approach and the theory provided by abstract non-interference, we focus only on the dimensions. The dimensions they propose are four: what information is released, who releases the information, where the information is released and when information can be released. This characterisation is general and allows a classification of the different notions, but it does not provide the way to connect the different dimensions. Abstract non-interference, instead, allows a different kind of unification. From a certain point of view, it is more restrictive since we can only investigate the what dimension (only recently we have extended our approach in order to include also the where dimension [31] ). We consider the same dimensional structure proposed by Sabelfeld and Sands, with the only difference that we further split the what dimension in two parts, that we call the two sides of non-interference: who observes and what is observed. Our idea is to understand which weakenings of non-interference focus on the external observer (attacker), and which weakenings focus on the information that can flow. In particular, from our point of view, the characterisation of the attacker is something external to the program, something unknown to the programmer. In this sense the policy can only certify security parametrically on a fixed observational power. If this power increases, then the program may fail to be secure. As said above, we call this side of non-interference the observer. On the other hand, focusing on the information that can flow, which we call observable, is something internal to the program that the policy fixes depending on the information the program manages. Hence, from this point of view, this characterization cannot change depending on the environment. Indeed, it is important to clearly distinguish these two aspects because they are independent, namely the policy can decide what it wants to protect, while several attackers, with different powers, can try to attack the program. In the same way, an attacker can try to disclose information from programs with different non-interference policies, protecting different private information.
Structure of the paper. In the next two sections we provide the necessary background material. In Sect. 4 we recall the notions of abstract noninterference from a new point of view. The idea is to distinguish two orthogonal sides of non-interference: who observes the program, the observer, and what is observed, the observable. For both we have two possible approaches. In the observer side we can model the attacker as an observer of the I/O behaviour (narrow approach) or we can model the attacker as a static analyzer of the program (abstract approach). In the observable side we can fix what has to be protected (block approach) or we can fix what can flow (allow approach). All these approaches can be combined to obtain different abstract non-interference policies. In Sect. 5 we use the abstract interpretation completeness framework for modelling the different approaches with respect to the two sides previously described, and we show that the characterisations we obtain are equivalent to the standard way of defining abstract non-interference. Again, all the different policies can be obtained by combining the given completeness models. In Sect. 6 we show that the characterisations of the attackers and the information released are instances of domain completeness transformations, but moreover, the completeness framework allows us to apply these transformations to all possible abstract non-interference policies. In Sect. 6.2.3, we discuss the adjoint relation, induced by the completeness framework, between the characterization of the strongest harmless attacker and the maximal information disclosed. In Sect. 7 we use completeness for transforming the semantics instead of the model [17] . We are able to show that while we can characterise the information released, we cannot characterise the information protected by a program. Finally, in Sect. 8 we provide some concluding remarks. This paper is an extended and revised version of [15] .
Basic notions
If S and T are sets, then ℘(S) denotes the powerset of S, S × T denotes the Cartesian product of S and T , S T denotes the set difference between S and T , S ⊂ T denotes strict inclusion, and for a function f :
We will often denote f ({x}) as f (x) and use lambda notation for functions. Function composition λx. f (g(x)) is denoted f • g. P, ≤ denotes a poset P with ordering relation ≤, while P, ≤, ∨, ∧, ⊤, ⊥ denotes a complete lattice P , with ordering ≤, lub ∨, glb ∧, greatest element (top) ⊤, and least element (bottom) ⊥. Often, ≤ P will be used to denote the underlying ordering of a poset P , and ∨ P , ∧ P , ⊤ P and ⊥ P denote the basic operations and elements if P is a complete lattice. id def = λx. x and ⊤ def = λx. ⊤ P . If S ⊆ P then ↓ S def = {x ∈ P | ∃y ∈ S. x ≤ y}. ↓ x is a shorthand for ↓ {x}. f : C → A is (completely) additive if f preserves lub's of all subsets of C (the empty set included). Continuity holds when f preserves lubs's of chains. Co-additivity and co-continuity are dually defined.
Abstract interpretation
Abstract interpretation is a general theory for specifying and designing approximate semantics of program languages [7] . Approximation can be equivalently formulated either in terms of Galois connections or closure operators [8] . An upper closure operator (uco for short) ρ : C → C on a poset C, representing concrete objects, is monotone, idempotent, and extensive: ∀x ∈ C. x ≤ C ρ(x). The upper closure operator is the function that maps the concrete values to their abstract properties, namely with the best possible approximation of the concrete value in the abstract domain. For example, the operator used in the introduction, Sign : ℘(Z) → ℘(Z), operating on the powerset of integers, associates each set of integers with its sign: Sign(∅) ="none", Sign(S) = + if ∀n ∈ S. x > 0, Sign(0) = 0, Sign(S) = − if ∀n ∈ S. n < 0 and Sign(S) = "I don't know" otherwise. The property names "none", +,0,− and "I don't know" are the names of the following sets in ℘(Z): ∅, n ∈ Z n > 0 , {0}, n ∈ Z n < 0 and Z. Analogously, the operator Par : ℘(Z) → ℘(Z) associates each set of integers with its parity, Par(∅) = "none" = ∅, Par(S) = ev = n ∈ Z n is even if ∀n ∈ S. n is even, Par(S) = od = n ∈ Z n is odd if ∀n ∈ S. n is odd and Par(S) = "I don't know" = Z otherwise. It is clear that the abstract elements, in general, correspond to the set of values satisfying the property they represent. Formally, closure operators ρ are uniquely determined by the set of their fix-points ρ(C), for instance Par = {Z, ev, od, ∅}. For upper closures, X ⊆ C is the set of fix-points of ρ ∈ uco(C) iff X is a Moore-family of C, i.e., X = M(X) def = {∧S | S ⊆ X} -where ∧∅ = ⊤ ∈ M(X). The set of all upper closure operators on C, denoted uco(C), is isomorphic to the so called lattice of abstract interpretations of C [8] . If C is a complete lattice then uco(C) ordered point-wise is also a complete lattice, uco(C), ⊑, ⊔, ⊓, ⊤, id where for every ρ, η ∈ uco(C), {ρ i } i∈I ⊆ uco(C) and x ∈ C: ρ ⊑ η iff ∀y ∈ C. ρ(y) ≤ η(y) iff η(C) ⊆ ρ(C); (⊓ i∈I ρ i )(x) = ∧ i∈I ρ i (x); and (⊔ i∈I ρ i )(x) = x ⇔ ∀i ∈ I. ρ i (x) = x. In the following we will find particularly convenient to identify closure operators (and therefore abstract domains) with their sets of fixpoints. The disjunctive completion of an abstract domain ρ ∈ uco(C) is the most abstract domain able to represent the concrete disjunction of its objects:
(ρ) = {η ∈ uco(C)|η ⊑ ρ and η is additive}. ρ is disjunctive iff (ρ) = ρ (cf. [8] ). Closure operators and partitions are related concepts. If π is a partition (viz. an equivalence relation), then [·] π is the corresponding equivalence class. A closure η ∈ uco(℘(S)) induces a partition on S:
The most concrete closure that induces the same partition of values as η is P(η) [34] . The idea is that P(η) is the most concrete closure such that for any y ∈ P(η(x)): P(η(x)) = P(η(y)), while in general η(y) ⊆ η(x).
Abstract domain completeness
In the previous section, we introduce abstract interpretation as a theory for approximating program behaviour by approximating their semantics. In this There are two kinds of completeness, called backward and forward completeness [18] . Backward completeness (B) requires accuracy when we compare the computations on the program input domain: the abstract outputs of the concrete computation f are the same abstract outputs obtained by computing the program on the abstract values. Formally, ρ is backward complete for f iff Fig. 2 . The outer oval always represents the concrete domain, while the inner one represents the abstract domain characterised by the closure ρ. The computation is represented by the function f . Hence, on the left, we have incompleteness since the abstract computation on the abstract values (ρ(f (ρ(x)))) loses precision with respect to (i.e., is more abstract than) the abstract computation on the concrete values (ρ(f (x))). On the right, we have completeness because the two abstract computations coincide.
Forward completeness (F ) requires accuracy when we compare the abstract and the concrete computations on the output domain of the program, i.e., we compare whether the abstract and the concrete outputs are the same when the program computes on the abstract values. Formally, given a semantics f and a closure ρ, ρ is forward complete for f iff ρ • f • ρ = f • ρ. Consider Fig. 3 . On the left, we have incompleteness since the concrete and the abstract computations on abstract values (respectively f (ρ(x)) and ρ(f (ρ(x)))) does not provide the same result, and in particular the abstraction of the computation loses precision. On the right, the two computations coincide since f returns, as output, an element in ρ, and therefore we have completeness.
An important feature of abstract domain completeness is that domains can be made complete, both backward and forward, with respect to any function. The problem of making abstract domains B-complete has been solved in [20] . These results have been extended to F -completeness in [18] . In the most general setting, we have potentially two different domains in input and in output C 1 and C 2 , and therefore two different abstractions η and ρ. Let f : C 1 → C 2 be a function on complete lattices C 1 and C 2 , and ρ ∈ uco(C 2 ) and η ∈ uco(C 1 ) be abstract domains. ρ, η is a pair of B[F ]-complete abstractions for f if
A pair of domain transformers can be associ- Figure 3 : Forward completeness ated with any completeness problem. We follow [12, 19] by defining a domain refinement and simplification as any monotone function τ : uco(L) → uco(L) such that X ⊆ τ (X) and τ (X) ⊆ X respectively. In [20] and [18] , a constructive characterization of the most abstract refinement, called the complete shell , and of the most concrete simplification, called the complete core, of any domain, making it F or B complete, for a given continuous function f , is given as a solution to a simple domain equation. Consider the following basic operators on closures:
f enriches a domain with all the direct images of the function f (the Moore closure makes the resulting set an abstract domain); R B f intuitively enriches a domain with all the inverse images of f . The C f operators make the dual operation of erasing respectively the direct and the inverse images of f . Let ℓ ∈ {F, B}. In [20] the authors proved that the only interesting cases, as far as the refinement and simplification towards ℓ-completeness are concerned, are respectively the most concrete β ⊒ ρ such that β, η is ℓ-complete and the most abstract β ⊑ η such that ρ, β is ℓ-complete. In particular given ρ ∈ uco(C 2 ) the Consider Fig. 4 , where the only difference with the previous figures is that we have two different abstractions, in input ρ and in output η. On the right, we show R F f which adds to the output domain the direct images of f . In this way, we force the image of f to be an element of η, and therefore we force the abstract and the concrete computations to be the same. On the left, we show C F f , which erases from the input domain the elements whose direct images under f are outside the output abstract domain η. In this case, we again change the abstract values in order to force the abstract and the concrete computations to be the same. Consider Fig. 5 . On the right, we show R B f , which adds the inverse images of f to the input domain. This forces the concrete and the abstract value to be the same, and therefore the abstract and the concrete computation collapse to be the same. On the left, we show C 2 and C ℓ f ∈ uco(uco(C)) (see [20] ). It is worth noting that ℓ-complete cores and shells are adjoint abstract domain transformers, i.e., adjoint functions on the lattice of abstract interpretations. For any η ∈ uco(C 1 ) and ρ ∈ uco(C 2 ), we have C
3 Information flows in language-based security
In this section, we recall some basic notions and notations necessary for understanding non-interference in language-based security. In particular, we focus on the semantic model of non-interference provided by Joshi and Leino [24] , which directly maps to completeness.
Confidential data are considered private, labeled with H (high level of secrecy), while all other data are public, labeled with L (low level of secrecy) [10] . Non-interference can be naturally expressed by using semantic models of program execution. This idea goes back to Cohen's work on strong dependency [5] , which uses denotational semantics to model how information can be transmitted among variables during program execution. Therefore non-interference for programs essentially means that "a variation of confidential (high or private) input does not cause a variation of public (low) output" [36] . When this happens, we say that the program has only secure information flows [2, 5, 9, 10, 24, 41] . This situation has been modeled by considering the denotational (input/output) semantics P of the program P . In particular, we consider programs where data are typed as private (H) or public (L). Program states in Σ are functions (represented as tuples) mapping variables in the set of values V. Finite traces on Σ are denoted Σ + . If T ∈ {H, L}, n = |{x ∈ Var(P )|x : T}|, and v ∈ V n , we abuse notation by denoting v ∈ V T the fact that v is a possible value for the variables with security type T. Moreover, we assume that any input s, can be seen as a pair (h, l), where s H = h is a value for private data and s L = l is a value for public data. In this case, non-interference can be formulated as follows.
Joshi and Leino's semantic-based approach. As we said above, a program is secure if any observation of the initial and final values of l : L do not provide any information about the initial value of h : H [24] . Assume that the adversary has knowledge of the program text and of the initial and final values of l. The idea of Joshi and Leino's semantic-based approach to language-based security is that of characterizing secure information flow as program equivalence, denoted by . =. They introduce a program HH def = "assign to h an arbitrary value". Consider a program P for which we want to prove non-interference. The program HH; P corresponds to run P after having set h to an arbitrary value; while the program P ; HH discards the final value of h resulting from the execution of P . Then a program P is said to be secure if
where . = is the relational input/output semantic equivalence between programs, namely for each possible input the two programs have to show the same public output behavior. Clearly, the two programs are input/output equivalent provided that the final value of l, produced by P , does not depend on the initial value of h, which is indeed standard non-interference.
Specifying the two sides of non-interference
Non-interference requires that from the public "observation" of the program I/O behaviour, an attacker is not able to disclose any "private property" of data. It is clear that when we deal with non-interference, we are implicitly considering two different aspects. The first consists in what the malicious attacker can observe of the public information, namely the attacker's observational power. The second, is what of the information we want to keep private. The distinction between these two aspects is important because it allows us to better understand which are the basic components of a non-interference policy, and hence to better characterize the relations between these components. On the one hand, we show that when we define non-interference policies, these aspects are completely independent; in particular the characterization of what we have to protect depends on the non-interference policy and on the program we analyze, while the attacker is something external to the program: we can only characterize for which attackers a given policy is secure. On the other hand, when we have a policy that combines these aspects, by fixing one we can characterize the other one.
In this section, we show that for each of these aspects of non-interference, i.e., attacker and secrets, we can have two different approaches. First, the model of the attacker can be considered as a simple observation of the program behaviour (narrow approach) or can be considered as an observer that can access also the code of the program and therefore that can statically analyze the code (abstract approach). Second, the definition of what is secret for the policy can also be characterized following two different directions: we can fix what we want to protect (block approach), or we can fix the maximal information that can flow (allow approach) [29] . Note that we call both these approaches declassification because this is the term used in literature when there is a downgrading of private information, and indeed in both these approaches we allow, in some way, the observation of some private information. Due to the strong independence between the observer and the observable aspects of non-interference, we can combine these approaches, obtaining four different notions of abstract non-interference.
Who is observing: The observation policy
Let us focus first on the attacker. By attacker we mean the agent that aims to learn some confidential information by analyzing, to the best of its possibilities, the system he/she is attacking. In the context of abstract non-interference [13] , we model these possibilities as abstractions of the system semantics and we can perform these abstractions in two ways: the narrow approach and the (strictly) abstract approach. In particular, the attacker is characterised by means of two abstractions: the abstract observation of the public input η and the abstract observation of the public output ρ, both modelled as abstract domains, i.e., upper closure operators.
The narrow approach to non-interference
In [13] the notion of narrow (abstract) non-interference (NNI for short) represents a first weakening of standard non-interference relative to a given model of an attacker. The idea behind this notion is to consider attackers that can observe the I/O behaviour of a program, without accessing the code of the program. In other words, they see the program as a black box, and can only analyze, by means of their observational capability, the input and the corresponding outputs of the program. Formally, given η, ρ ∈ uco(℘(V L )), respectively, the input and the output observation, we say that a program P satisfies narrow non-interference, written [ 
The problem with this notion is that it allows a variation also of public inputs, provided that they have the same input property η. In fact, the output may also be affected by this variation, generating false alarm situations that we call deceptive flows [13] . Consider, for instance, l := l * h 2 , and consider the public input property of being an even number, then we can observe a variation of the output's sign due to the existence of both negative and positive even numbers, revealing flows which does not depend on the private data. These flows are called deceptive, since they generate false alarms. These flows represent the lack of observational precision of the attacker, due to the fact that he/she can only observe the input/output behaviour of the program, with the public input that can range inside the same property. Nevertheless, this notion is taken into account since it considers a simple model of attacker. In fact, even if the attacker can only observe behaviours, from these observations it is anyway able to perform a kind of reverse engineering for stealing some confidential information. Moreover, this notion corresponds to other weakenings of noninterference existing in the literature (e.g., PERs [37] ).
The abstract approach to non-interference
A different abstract interpretation-based approach to non-interference can be obtained by modelling attackers as static analyzers of programs. In this case, we check non-interference by considering the best correct approximation of the program semantics in the abstract domains modelling the attacker. Formally, the idea is to compute the semantics on abstract values, obtaining again a notion of non-interference where only the private input can vary. In fact, we consider as public input, the set of all the public inputs with the same property η. Hence, as in standard non-interference, the only input that can change is the private one. In other words, this notion avoids deceptive flows. What we obtain is a policy such that when the attacker is able to observe the property η of public input, and the property ρ of public output, then no information flow concerning the private input is observable from the public output. We call this notion abstract non-interference (ANI for short). A program P satisfies abstract non-interference, written (η)P (ρ), if
where we abuse notation denoting by P also the additive lift, to sets of states, of the denotational semantics of P . Note that [id]P (id) models exactly (standard) non-interference. Moreover, we have that abstract non-interference is a weakening of both, standard and narrow non-interference:
, while standard noninterference is not stronger than the narrow one due to deceptive flows [13] .
What is observed: The protection policy
At this point, we can consider another fundamental aspect of non-interference policies: what is released or protected. While in the previous section we studied who observes the program, now we analyze the weaknesses of programs under attack. The idea is to model what information the program can release, independently from the attacker. We model non-interference policies where we fix the private information that either we want to protect (block approach) or we accept to flow (allow approach). Note that in this context, we consider declassification while ignoring where [38] declassification takes place.
The block approach to declassification
Let us describe the blocking approach introduced in the original notion of abstract non-interference [13] . Note that in standard non-interference we have to protect the value of private data. If we interpret this fact from the point of view of what we have to keep secret, then we can say that we want to block the identity property of the private data domain. In the definition, we make the private input range in the domain of values and we check if these changes are detectable from the observation of the public output. Suppose, for instance, that we are interested in keeping secret the parity of input private data. Then we make the private input range over the abstract domain of parity, so we check if there is a variation in the public output only when the parity of the private input changes 3 . In other words, we are not interested in observing what happens to the public output when both the private inputs are even (or odd), since any property variation that does not imply parity can flow and can be observed through a variation of the public output. On the other hand, the fact that we want to protect parity is modelled by observing that the distinction between even and odd private inputs corresponds exactly to what must not be visible to a public output observer. Formally, consider an abstract domain φ ∈ uco(V H ) modelling the private information we want to keep secret. A program P satisfies non-interference declassified via blocking (B-DNI for short),
Clearly, this a weakened form of standard non-interference since we reduce the test cases and therefore we implicitly allow some confidential information to flow into the public observation. We can obtain the narrow and the abstract declassified forms simply by combining this notion with each one of the previous notions obtaining respectively, B-DNNI, [ 
In this case it is simple to check that (id)P (Sign []Par) holds.
The allow approach to declassification
Finally, let us introduce the allow approach to declassification. This is a wellknown approach, which has been introduced and enforced in several ways in the literature [29, 38] . The idea is to fix which aspects of the private information can be observed by an unclassified observer. From this point of view, the standard notion of non-interference, where nothing has to be observed, can be interpreted by saying that only the property ⊤ (i.e., "I don't know the private property") is declassified. This corresponds to saying that we have to check non-interference only for those private inputs that have the same declassified property, noting that all the values are mapped to ⊤ and hence have the same abstract property. Suppose, for instance, that we want to downgrade the parity. This means that we do not care if the observer sees any change due to the variation of this private input property. For this reason, we only check the variations of the output when the private inputs have the same parity property. Formally, consider an abstract domain φ modelling the private information that is downgraded. A program P satisfies non-interference declassified via allowing (A-DNI for short), written
This a weakened form of standard non-interference, since as before, we reduce the test cases, allowing some confidential information to flow. We can obtain the narrow and the abstract declassified form simply by combining this notion with each one of the first two notions obtaining respectively, A-DNNI, [η]P (φ ⇒ ρ), and A-DANI, (η)P (φ ⇒ ρ) [13] .
Characterising abstract non-interference properties
In abstract non-interference, an attacker is an abstract domain on the powerset of public values. This means that it can be represented by means of the sets of values that the attacker can observe, namely by means of the fix-points of the abstraction modelling it. The characterisation of the harmless output observer unable to violate abstract non-interference is based on the definition of a predicate, Secr, that must hold for all elements representing the observational capability of the attacker. Let us give an intuition of this predicate.
If the attacker can observe in output a set X of values (which means that it cannot distinguish values inside X), then the attacker is harmless if X does not allow the attacker to discern values that should not be distinguished for guaranteeing ANI. For instance, ANI is satisfied by P if, whenever we require
L ∈ X, and vice versa, otherwise ANI is violated. Therefore, we define Υ(l), which, for each l ∈ V L , consists in all values that must not be distinguished by an attacker observing η in input. At this point we can say that X satisfies Secr if it does not "break" any of these Υ(l), i.e., ∀l
In other words, if ρ models an harmless attacker, then ∀X ∈ ρ we have that Secr(X) holds. This characterization was proposed in the particular cases of narrow and abstract non-interference with declassification via blocking [13] . Here we rewrite this predicate in order to isolate the characterization of the attacker, in both the narrow and the abstract case, while avoiding the declassification aspects.
Let us define the following collections of the sets of elements that must not be distinguished in the given policy:
) an input public observation. We can define the predicate Secr Π P in the following way:
Theorem 4.2 [13] A program P satisfies Π ∈ {NNI(η), ANI(η)} with input observation η and output ρ iff ∀X ∈ ρ. Secr
Exactly as for the definitions, the combination of the two sides in the same policy is quite straightforward and allow us to characterise harmless attackers also in the presence of declassification policies. In order to show how to extend the result above to the policies obtained by combination, it is sufficient to show how we can define the corresponding sets Υ:
• Block-DNNI:
Note that this corresponds to the notion of backward stability for partitions [30] • Block-DANI:
Abstract non-interference as completeness
Joshi and Leino's semantic-based approach to information flows [24] provides a way to interpret abstract non-interference as the problem of abstract domain completeness [7, 20] . The idea is to rewrite Equation (1) in terms of the semantics of its components. Hence, instead of the programs P and HH, we consider their denotational semantics P and HH . The interesting observation is that the semantics of HH can be characterized as an abstract domain. In particular, the program that associates with private variables an arbitrary value can be interpreted as the closure that abstracts the private value to the "I don't know" abstract value, i.e., the set of all the possible values for private variables. Therefore, we define the function H :
It is straightforward to prove its monotonicity, idempotence and extensivity. So we can finally conclude that
Hence, non-interference can be equivalently formalized as the following completeness problem:
We use this completeness characterisation in order to exploit the abstract domain completeness theory in the context of non-interference in language-based security. In particular, a non-interference policy is completely characterised by a pair of abstract domains (one modelling the attacker and one modelling the information declassified or protected) and a completeness equation. Hence, by simply applying the existing abstract domain transformations for inducing completeness, we can characterize both the most concrete harmless attacker and the maximal information released. This holds for all the non-interference policies that we can characterize as abstract domain completeness problems. Therefore, we first have to determine how we can change the domain H, in order to find the completeness equation corresponding to each one of the given notions, and to each possible combination. We can show that each one of the four different notions described is modelled by a different transformation of H, moreover, the abstract non-interference approach and the block approach, consider also a transformed semantics, due to the fact that they model an analysis of the semantics.
The observer side
In order to model NNI and ANI by using the completeness equation we have to embed the abstractions characterizing the attacker into the abstract domain H. Hence, let us first note that H = λX.
, H is the product of respectively the top and the bottom abstractions in the lattice of abstract interpretations. In other words, H denotes exactly the fact that on the public data we can observe the identity id. Hence, if we observe an abstract property ρ instead of the identity, the idea is simply to define an abstract domain where id is replaced by the observed abstraction ρ. Consider the closure ρ ∈ uco(℘(V L )). We define
The narrow approach
Let us consider the narrow approach to non-interference. In order to model narrow non-interference as completeness, we have first to understand where and how we can model the two abstractions η and ρ that characterize the narrow notion. Hence, if we can observe only η of public data in input, then the input abstract domain to consider is H η , while if we observe only ρ on the output, then the abstract output domain to consider is H ρ . In this way we obtain the following completeness characterization of narrow (abstract) non-interference, corresponding to the completeness Equation 2, generalized for narrow non-interference:
The next theorem tells us that while the completeness formalization of non-interference always implies the semantic-based definition of (abstract) noninterference, the reverse direction holds only for abstract input domains that are completely defined by their behaviour on singletons, i.e, partitioning domains.
Proof.
Let us understand what completeness means in this case
. Hence, the equality becomes
, which has to hold for each l ∈ V L and h ∈ V H . Moreover, the following relations hold:
which is narrow abstract non-interference.
2. Consider η partitioning. By definition, this implies that η(l) = {y | η(y) = η(l)} ( * ). Suppose H ρ • P • H η = H ρ • P then we have the following implications:
This result shows 5 that NNI is weaker than the generalization of Joshi and Leino's semantics-based approach to non-interference, which is a problem of completeness. In fact, in order to guarantee that NNI implies the completeness characterization, η needs to be partitioning. Nevertheless, in practice, we can say that the two formalizations given in the theorem are indeed equivalent since in [22] [Prop. 8] the authors proved that NNI can be equivalently characterized both in terms of abstract domains or in terms of partitions, i.e., partitioning domains. This means that without losing generality, we can always suppose that NNI is defined by using partitioning closures, in particular for the input.
The abstract approach
The difference between the narrow and the abstract approach is that in the abstract case, we consider attackers that can analyze the code of the program. This formally corresponds to defining non-interference by using the abstract semantics. Hence, in order to extend Theorem 5.1 to model abstract noninterference, we have to abstract the program semantics. The idea is to consider an abstract semantics that is applied to abstract (public and private) data. Consider the closure η ∈ uco(℘(V L )). We define the abstract semantics as follows:
If we look at the definition of abstract non-interference, we note that we have η both in the semantics and as constraint on the input domain, since we have to consider only public inputs with the same η property. This means that the right formalization of ANI via completeness is
It is clear that when we have simply to check this equality we can consider a simpler input domain. In fact, the property η is embedded in the semantics;
hence by idempotence of abstract domains, P η • H η = P η • H. By using this equality we obtain the following completeness characterization of the abstract approach to non-interference, corresponding to the completeness Equation 2 for the abstract approach.
The next theorem shows that the equation above completely characterizes ANI as a completeness problem 6 .
By definition of H ρ we have the following equalities:
. We have this for each possible input and therefore for each possible input we have the same result.
(⇒) Suppose H ρ • P η • H = H ρ • P η then we have the following implications:
It is worth noting that the only difference between the narrow and the abstract approach, in the corresponding completeness problems, is due to the way the public input is treated and, therefore, to the program semantics: in ANI η is embedded in the semantics, i.e., we consider P η ; in NNI η is embedded in the input abstract domain and the semantics we use is the concrete one P .
The observable side
In the previous section, we have seen how we can adapt the completeness equation characterizing non-interference in order to deal with, respectively, the narrow and the abstract approach for modelling attackers. In this section, we observe how we can adapt the same equation in order to deal with respectively, the block and the allow approach to declassification. The interesting aspect of this model is that what we have to modify to model declassification is independent of what we have to modify to model the attacker. This is important because it allows, also in the completeness formalization, the combination of the approaches we have seen for the attacker and for declassification. Moreover, note that in the observer side, the feature that discerns the two approaches is "where" we consider the input public observation: in the semantics or in the abstract domain. Analogously, also in the observable side, the difference between the block and the allow approaches lies in "where" we put the confidential information observation: in the semantics (block approach) or in the abstract domain (allow approach).
The block approach to declassification
In the block approach to declassification, exactly as it happens for ANI, we have to consider an abstract semantics, since in this kind of declassification, we have to make the property, and not the value, change. Hence, consider an abstract domain φ ∈ uco(℘(V H )), where we have to define the abstract semantics as follows P
Since the observation we consider for modelling declassification is the identity on the public data, the abstract domain we have to use for both the input and the output is H, while the abstract semantics just defined embeds the private property φ we have to protect. Hence, the completeness equation for the block approach corresponding to Equation 2 is
The following theorem shows also that the completeness formalization completely captures the notion of declassified non-interference, since we do not need any additional hypothesis.
L , and hence we have completeness. On the other hand, if ∀h ∈ V H we have
The allow approach to declassification
Finally, we can model the allow approach to declassification as a completeness problem. Consider an abstract domain φ ∈ uco(℘(V H )). The allow approach considers the concrete semantics P of the program, since the property φ is only used for deciding when we have to check whether non-interference is satisfied or not. For this reason, the property φ is embedded in the input abstract domain in a way similar to what we have done for the narrow input abstract domain [1] .
Consider any l ∈ X L . Define the set H l def = {h ∈ V H | h, l ∈ X}; i.e., given a value l, H l contains all the H values associated with l in X. Then the "declassified" abstract domain, H φ (X), corresponding to X, is defined as
Note that the domain H, for ordinary noninterference, is the instantiation of H φ , where φ maps any set to ⊤. The analogue of equation (2) is
Now we can connect H φ to NI: the only caveat is that φ must partition the input abstract domain, i.e., ∀x. φ(x) = {y | φ(x) = φ(y)}. The intuition behind partitioning is that φ's image on singletons is all we need for deriving the property of any possible set.
Theorem 5.4 [1][Th. 5.1] Consider a partitioning φ. Then P satisfies noninterference declassified by φ iff H
• P • H φ = H • P .
Combining the different approaches
We often underlined that an interesting aspect of the abstract interpretationbased approach to non-interference consists in the fact that it allows us to understand the relation between the model of the attacker and the information declassified/released. Moreover, the completeness characterizations make even clearer that attacker and declassification consist in two orthogonal aspects of non-interference that in the policy can be defined separately, since they concern different components of the equation. Hence we can perfectly combine the several approaches introduced so far, obtaining four different notions of abstract non-interference. Clearly, the possible combinations of abstract notions are all parametric respectively on the public observations η, ρ ∈ uco(℘(V L )) and on the private observation φ ∈ uco(℘(V H )) (which can model either the information protected or the information declassified):
Note that the differences among all these notions depend on where we put the input abstraction, respectively private, for declassification, and public, for the attacker model.
Transforming abstract domains for ANI
In the previous section, we showed how any abstract non-interference policy is indeed a problem of completeness of a suitable abstract domain modelling the policy itself, with respect to the semantics of the program. We think that the main added value of the completeness model is that we can inherit in the secure information flow context, the whole completeness framework, together with the abstract domain completeness transformers. These transformers are useful, since abstract domains represent the model of the attacker and the information declassified. Hence, whenever we transform abstract domains for inducing completeness we transform what they represent, i.e., the attacker and the declassification policy for making non-interference hold. Let us first recall the characterisations of attackers and information released, extended here to the four notions of abstract non-interference. Afterwards, we show that these transformers are exactly those induced by the completeness model.
Attackers vs information released
In previous work on abstract non-interference, the only combinations considered were narrow non-interference (NNI) and abstract non-interference, both via blocking (simply called abstract non-interference [13, 14, 15, 29] ) and via allowing [13, 15, 29] . The first two have been considered for characterizing the strongest harmless output observer, which is the most concrete observation unable to disclose any secret property. In the abstract case, the characterized observer is the most concrete one, unable to disclose anything about a fixed private property φ that have to be protected. The latter has been considered for characterizing the maximal amount of information disclosed in the abstract context. Namely, given an attacker, we can characterize which is the maximal confidential information released, given in terms of observable confidential data properties.
Characterizing attackers
In [13] , two methods for deriving the most concrete output observation for a program, given the input one, for both narrow and abstract non-interference are provided. In particular, the idea is that of collecting, in the same abstract object, all the elements that, if distinguished, would generate a visible flow. These most concrete output observations that are not able to get information from the program P , observing η in input, are, respectively, denoted [η] P (id) and (η) P (φ []id), both in uco(℘(V L )). As far as the characterization of the strongest harmless attacker is concerned, the following theorem holds [13] :
This result tells us that [η] P (id) and (η) P (φ []id) are the most concrete output observation satisfying abstract non-interference, in the corresponding forms. The construction of the most concrete harmless attacker for abstract non-interference is based on the definition of the predicate Secr (see Sect. 4.3), which has to hold for all the observable sets characterising an harmless attacker, namely for all the fix-points of the abstraction modelling the attacker. In fact, Theorem 4.2 tells us that an attacker is harmless if all the sets that it can observe, namely all the elements of the abstract domain modelling it, satisfy Secr. Hence, we can conclude that we can characterize the most powerful harmless attacker for non-interference policies, when declassification is not considered, simply by taking the abstract domain containing all the possible elements in ℘(V L ) satisfying the predicate Secr. In [13] it is proved that this set,
, depending on the abstract non-interference policy we are considering.
Characterizing information released
The abstract interpretation-based approach to non-interference can be exploited also for characterizing the maximal amount of confidential information released, modelled in terms of the most concrete property observable by a given attacker. The idea is to find the maximal amount of information disclosed by computing the most abstract property on confidential data which has to be declassified in order to guarantee secrecy. In other words, the idea is to characterize the minimal aggregations of confidential inputs that do not generate any variation in the public output. In the literature, this characterization exists only for abstract non-interference with declassification, here called A-DANI, where we fix the input and the output observation of the considered attacker, i.e., η and ρ, and we compute the maximal information that a program releases to this attacker [13] . This information is modelled in terms of the distinctions that the attacker can observe among the private possible inputs simply by observing the public outputs. Clearly, by fixing the model of the attacker to the most concrete possible for our program, we have a certification of the secrets the the program can release.
In order to compute this maximal private property released, we have to collect together all and only the private values that cannot generate a variation of the output, i.e., we compute the following partition of the input domain [13] Π P (η, ρ)
This is the set of all the pairs H, L ∈ ℘(V H )×℘(V L ), such that whenever η(l) = L, for any input h 1 , h 2 ∈ V H , no information flows from private to public are generated. In other words, we have that ρ ( P (h 1 , η(l) ) L ) = ρ( P (h 2 , η(l)) L ). Hence, if, for example, one of these H is the set of even numbers, and another one is the set of odd numbers, this corresponds to saying that the attacker is able to derive differences due to the change of the parity of the private input, namely it is able to observe the parity of the secrets. This also means that the program is secure only if, at least, we declassify parity.
By observing its definition, we can note that this partition cannot change the property η on public inputs, and therefore it can be directly used for deriving the new partition on the private data. For each L ∈ η, we define the corresponding partition induced on the private input domain:
The partition on private data corresponds to the most abstract property that flows when the property observed of the public input is exactly L. The property so far obtained corresponds to a kind of declassification dependent on the particular public input observed, known in the literature as delimited release [35, 29] . Here, we are interested in finding the most concrete property released by the program, i.e., independent from the particular input observation. For this reason we take the most concrete partition among all the ones released by the different public input observations:
In particular, this domain can be also seen as the most abstract property that contains all the possible variations of private inputs that generate insecure information flows, and it is the most concrete such that each variation generates a flow. It uniquely represents the confidential information that flows into the public output [13] .
Example 6.2 Consider the program fragment:
Suppose that the attacker can observe only the parity of the public output. Then we can compute the partition Π P (id, Par) as the union of the following sets: if the public input is an even number then the parity of the output does not depend on the value of h, namely we have the set { Z, l | l ∈ 2Z}; if the public input is an odd number the the output parity depends on the value of h, and in particular on its parity, hence we have also the set { 2Z, l | l ∈ 2Z + 1} and the set { 2Z + 1, l | l ∈ 2Z + 1}. Therefore by using the notation above we have that if l ∈ 2Z then Π P (id, Par) |l = Z and if l ∈ 2Z+1 then Π P (id, Par) |l = {2Z, 2Z+1}. Therefore, the most abstract partition on private data that has to be declassified is {2Z, 2Z + 1}. In other words looking at the parity of the low variables leakes only the parity of the high variables.
Note that in the context of the observer side, we are able to derive the strongest harmless attacker for both the possible approaches. On the other hand, in the observable side, we have just seen that we are able to derive the maximal information released, but we did not provide a technique for characterizing the maximal information that the program can protect. In Sect. 7, we use the completeness formalization of non-interference to show that indeed, it is not possible to characterize this information whenever something is released.
Attackers vs information released in completeness
At this point, we move to the completeness model and therefore we have to understand which is the meaning of abstract domain completeness transformations for each abstract non-interference policy. From the abstract domain completeness framework [20] we know that when we have a completeness equation with two different domains for the input and the output respectively, among all possible combinations the only meaningful transformations are the core of the output domain and the shell of the input one [20] (see Sect. 2.2 for details).
In particular we will show that shell and core have two different and precise meanings: the core, which abstracts the output abstract domain, simplifies the public output observation, viz. characterizes the most concrete attacker that cannot disclose private properties; the shell, which concretizes the input domain, in general refines the private declassified property, viz. characterizes the most abstract property that flows. From the definition above, it is worth noting that while the meaning of the core is almost straightforward and intuitive, for the shell more considerations must be made. In fact, from the definitions given before, we can see that when we consider the core transformation, we transform the output domain H ρ , which is the same in all the notions and which always allows us to characterize the most concrete observation unable to disclose information. Moreover, since the core abstracts H ρ , it can only abstracts the public domain ρ, since the private abstraction is the most abstract domain possible, i.e., ⊤ = λX. V H . This clearly implies that the core transformation can be used only when we admit in the model abstract attackers, narrow or abstract.
Consider now the complete shell transformation. The shell refines the input domain, which deals with both the attacker model (η) in the narrow approach, and with the information declassified (φ) in the allow approach. Moreover, it is immediate to note that the input domain is different in each of the above notions. Let us analyze the meaning of shell for each of these notions, starting with the allow approaches. In the case of A-DANI the domain that we can refine is H φ , which corresponds to the abstraction φ of the private input, together with the identity on the public input. It is clear that when we refine this domain, we can only refine φ, since the public abstraction is the identity, i.e, the ⊥ of uco(℘(V L )). Therefore, what we obtain from the refinement is the domain φ ′ , the closest to φ that makes A-DANI hold. Thus, we characterize the maximal amount of information disclosed. Consider now A-DNNI. In this case, the domain we refine is H φ η , which abstracts with φ and η, respectively, the private and the public input. In this case the refinement process can refine both φ and η. The refinement of φ has clearly the same meaning as before, while the refinement of η allows us to avoid deceptive interference in the narrow approach. Hence, the shell can be used in the allow approach to declassification for modelling the maximal amount of private information disclosed, and in narrow non-interference for avoiding deceptive interference, as we will see later on. Due to the meaning just explained of the refinement of the private abstraction in the shell process, in the block approach the shell has a relevant meaning only for B-DNNI, and only for the public part.
Simplifying the output domain
Let us use the completeness characterization as the formal framework where we can provide a general and parametric technique for certifying programs depending on the security policy they satisfy. We refer to the four possible policies we can formalize in this context. We note that all definitions have the same output domain, but differ in the input domain, which is denoted as H in , and in the semantic function of P , denoted as f P . Using these notations, we can write a general equation for non-interference.
Note that we consider H in the output since we are interested in finding the most concrete simplification of the output domain which makes non-interference hold for the given program. In other words, since we want to characterize the security level of the program, we start from the most powerful observer and we minimally weaken it in order to characterize for which observers the program is secure. Each particular notion is identified by the pair H in , f P , and not all possible combinations are acceptable. The only meaningful combinations are the ones introduced previously, in particular H η , P φ for B-DNNI, H, P φ η for B-DANI, H φ η , P for A-DNNI and finally H φ , P η for A-DANI. The next theorem shows that if we simplify the output abstract domain H to make it complete, in the abstract domain completeness framework, we obtain a new output abstract domain that can be characterized as a domain of the form H ρ that identifies exactly the most concrete public output harmless observation ρ.
) be partitioning in the NNI case and φ ∈ uco(℘(V H )), and let f P and H in depending respectively on these domains, as described before. Then we have
Hin fP (H)} corresponds to maximal output observer harmless for the policy fixed by H in , f P .
Proof. C
Hin fP (H) is the completeness core for the equation
Hence, by Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2 we can conclude that since the core is the most concrete domain more abstract than H in which satisfies the completeness equation, then it models the most concrete harmless attacker. We have to prove that the core is exactly the domain described above.
where the last equality holds since f P is additive (being an additive lift) on
This theorem applies the notion of completeness core to the abstract noninterference context. In particular we can observe that this core collects together, in the same set L, all the public outputs which are images, under f P , of sets (of inputs h, l ) which are in the input domain H in . In order to better understand, suppose H in = H. Then an element of H must be of the form V H , X ; hence, the core construction says that the resulting sets L must collect together all the public output values due to all the possible private inputs and to a particular set of public inputs X. Namely, the output observation of these sets L satisfies abstract non-interference. On the other hand, if we consider
∈ H in due to h 2 , which implies precisely that if the attacker can observe L then he/she can distinguish h 1 from h 2 . Hence, this construction has a strong relationship with non-interference, and in particular we can show that this core corresponds exactly to the characterisation of the stronger harmless attacker introduced in abstract non-interference.
The most concrete observer as completeness core. In Sect. 6.1.1 we recall a method for systematically deriving the most concrete harmless attacker (canonical attacker) associated with a given program. By Theorem 5.2, the most concrete public observer, which is the most powerful harmless attacker, can be derived as the most concrete output abstraction satisfying the following completeness problem:
Then we have the following result, which allows us to specify the canonical attacker as the fix-point of an abstract domain simplification.
In this case we consider the projection on the public domain of the completeness core derived in Theorem 6.3, and we obtain the minimal aggregation of public values unable to distinguish any variation of private inputs, namely the maximal information that an attacker can observe without disclosing any private input information.
Example 6.5 Consider the program fragment P def = l := 2 * h where l : L and h : H P violates standard non-interference, since we have that
where, clearly 2Z = 4. Let us derive the complete core of H. From [20] we have to keep only those elements whose inverse image is a fix-point of H:
which corresponds to abstracting the public output in the domain that is not able to distinguish even numbers. Let
Example 6.6 Consider the following program fragment, with l : L and h : H.
Let's consider the core for making H, H complete for
It is straightforward to show that C H P (H) corresponds to the domain that abstracts the public data in the domain {n{2} N | n ∈ 2Z + 1} , where we define {2}
N , and 
Refining the input domain
Consider the transformation of the input domain, given the output one H ρ and the corresponding semantics f P . The input domain is always H η 7 , hence the semantics completely characterizes the chosen policy. In sake of simplicity, we suppose to characterize the private input property that flows, and therefore, in the allow approach, we start with φ = id. Hence, given the output observation H ρ , with ρ ∈ uco(℘(V L )), the completeness equation we consider is
Note that not all possible f P are acceptable. In fact, the refining of the input is meaningful only for the allow approach to the observable side. This means that the possible semantic functions are f P ∈ { P , P η }.
The following results show that by refining the input domain, we can make noninterference hold. In particular, we can induce a partition of input states which collects together all those states leading to the same public observation.
Lemma 6.7 Let ρ ∈ uco(D), and
The following lemma provides an explicit characterisation of the shell refinement operator in the context of abstract non-interference. We see that it splits the elements of H η that lead to different public outputs: it leaves, in the same set, only those pairs h ′ , l ′ whose output observations (by means of ρ) are in the same abstract element.
Proof. First of all we want to characterize the complete shell of H η .
At this point, given an input state h 1 , l 1 , we have to prove that the least
} is exactly the set of states
In fact, the image of h 1 , l 1 in the corresponding closure is the least among its fixpoints containing h 1 , l 1 . By definition of Moore closure we have that M(X) = { S | S ⊆ X}; hence, we have that the set M({{ h, l | ρf
Hence, the set above is equal to
Hence the set above is equal to
Now, by definition, we said above that the corresponding abstraction of h 1 , l 1 is the smallest set containing h 1 , l 1 , namely the smallest set of states
Finally, we show how we can interpret the completeness shell transformer in the abstract non-interference framework. The refined domain R maps in the same abstract element all the inputs that make the program satisfy the abstract non-interference policy.
Proof. Let us prove the two directions separately.
•
We know that R refines the partition induced by the input domain, which is H η . This means that if R(
At this point, note that this fact implies ρ(
It is worth noting that in the abstract case, the partition induced by the complete shell of
This simple fact implies that the reduced product cannot refine the property η on the public data, when dealing with ANI. This means that the only component which is actually refined is the abstraction on private data, and this corresponds to the most abstract partition of private data which can be declassified.
On the other hand, in the narrow case this transformation concretizes the input domain in order to make the equation hold. Clearly this transformation can refine both the private observation ⊤, characterizing the information released, and the public observation η. This last possible refinement consists exactly in the cancellation of deceptive interference. Namely, the result of the completeness transformation is the most abstract input domain satisfying noninterference which characterizes both the best concretization of the public input observation η without deceptive interference, and the maximal amount that in any case is released.
Theorem 6.9 tells us that the refinement of the input domain provides a partition of input states collecting together all and only those states leading to the same public observation. We underlined above that in the abstract case this refinement induces a refinement only of the private input property, i.e., induces exactly a characterization of the least declassification making the program secure. On the other hand, in the narrow approach, we can always characterize the information released, but, together, we also characterize the deceptive flows, and these characterizations can be related, namely the state partition induced may not be isomorphic to the product of a partition on the public domain with a partition on the private one. For this reason, in order to correctly derive the information released, and, therefore, the information that needs to be declassified, we have first to avoid deceptive interference. Hence, the refinement induced on the public domain is used to compute the partition on the private one. 
Let us abuse notation by denoting with Π H and Π L also the corresponding parti-
Proof. First of all, note that for Π
The equality for Π L is straightforward. Suppose now that Π 
This means that if we compute the partition defined above, we have that
Sign,Par
Sign,Par 
Sign,Par Sign,Par The most abstract observable as completeness shell. In Sect.6.1.2, we recall a method for systematically deriving the maximal information released by a given program. By Theorem 5.4, the most abstract confidential observable, which is the maximal information released, can be derived as the most abstract input abstraction satisfying the following completeness problem:
In particular, we recall that the partition Π P (η, ρ) |Y , for the abstract noninterference policy observing η in input and ρ in output, fixes a public input observation Y ∈ η and collects together all the private inputs leading to the same output observation in ρ. At this point, the following corollary, connects the completeness shell transformer to the information released characterisation. In particular, it tells us that given the input observation Y ∈ η, the equivalence classes induced by the shell R correspond exactly to the equivalence classes induced by the relation Π P (η, ρ) |Y , which characterises the information released.
Proof. The characterisation of the information released is
We define the sets Π P (η, ρ) |Y = {X ⊆ V H | X, Y ∈ Π P (η, ρ)}, for each Y ∈ η, which are partitions of private data.
Next examples show how declassification can be obtained as solutions of completeness problems.
Example 6.14 Consider the program fragment: P def = l := l * h 2 , with l : L and h : H. We want to find the shell in order to make the input/output pair of abstract domains H, H Par complete for the map P .
This means that the reduced product generates also 2Z, 2Z + 1 and therefore 2Z, l for each l ∈ 2Z + 1.
As in abstract declassification [13] , this means that it is the variation of parity of the private input that generates the flow. Compute, first, the information released, as we have seen in Sect. 6.1.2:
Therefore we obtain Π P (η, ρ) |10Z = Π P (η, ρ) |2Z = {4Z ∪ 4Z + 3, 4Z + 1 ∪ 4Z + 2} and Π P (η, ρ) |5Z = Π P (η, ρ) |Z = {4Z ∪ 4Z + 3, 4Z + 1, 4Z + 2}. Consider now the completeness shell:
Then we have: 
Adjoining observer and observable properties
Modeling attackers means characterizing the maximal power of an harmless attacker, i.e., an attacker which cannot disclose confidential information. Declassification, instead, means characterizing the information revealed to a fixed attacker. As we have seen in the previous sections, the model of the most concrete harmless attacker corresponds to the most concrete public observer, while abstract declassification is characterized by the most abstract private observable. Clearly, there is a strong relation between these two notions, since the more powerful is the attacker and the less is the confidential information that can be kept private. In other words, the index of the partition of private data for declassification is proportional to the cardinality of the abstract domain which models the precision of the property that the attacker can observe. This phenomenon can be precisely characterized in the lattice of abstract interpretations as an adjunction. In Sect. 1, Fig. 1 , we have informally described which is the relation between observer and observable in an abstract non-interference policy. We now formally justify this relation.
In Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, we proved that the characterisations of the most concrete harmless attacker and of the maximal information released can be both interpreted as instances of the problem of making abstractions complete. While the private observable for declassification is obtained by computing the completeness shell, the public observer, modeling the attacker, is obtained by computing the completeness core in the same completeness problem. These abstract domain transformers have been proved in [20] to be adjoint functions (see Sect. 2) on the lattice of abstract interpretations. The following result is therefore a consequence of Theorem 6.4 and 6.13.
) be a disjunctive property, and P a program. Then we have that id
This result provides a precise mathematical framework where declassification and attack models can be systematically derived and compared with each other in the lattice of abstract interpretations by applying well known methods for abstract domain design. This framework can be the basis for applying quantitative methods and metrics [3] for measuring the amount of information leaked relatively to a given attack model, or by adjunction, the precision of an attacker under the hypothesis that some information can be declassified.
Transforming semantics for ANI
In the previous sections, we noted that in the abstract non-interference context, by using the completeness characterisation, we cannot derive the best input observation, given the output one, simply by transforming the input abstract domain. This because the input domain η is a component of the semantics and not of the abstract domain. Similarly, we are not able to characterise the confidential information we have to protect, because again, this information is embedded in the semantics and not in the abstractions. Hence, in order to obtain these characterisations we need a technique for transforming the semantics, i.e., the function, instead of the domains, for abstract domain completeness. The idea is to consider transformers inducing completeness by "repairing" the program (semantics) instead of "repairing" the observations. This is a new approach to completeness recently studied [17] in the most general case of monotone functions. In this paper, the idea is to minimally transform functions, by reducing or by increasing their output, in order to make a completeness equation hold with respect to a given pair of abstract domains, respectively the input and the output domain.
We aim to instantiate this new approach to the abstract non-interference context, where transforming functions means transforming semantics, and therefore programs. In this way, we are able to minimally transform also those aspects of an abstract non-interference policy which are embedded in the semantics, i.e., the public input observation in the abstract approach and the private input abstraction in the block approach. Unfortunately, we can only show that the only ways we have for transforming the semantics for completeness in the abstract non-interference context are trivial. These negative results are nevertheless important because they tell us that it is not possible to constructively characterise the input harmless attacker in the abstract approach, or the information protected by a program in the block approach to declassification.
Consider the domain of functions as ordered by pointwise inclusion, i.e., f ≤ g ⇐⇒ ∀x. f (x) ≤ g(x). Then we can choose to transform the function by making it either smaller or greater than the original one.
Consider the generic ANI completeness equation H ρ • f P • H in = H ρ • f P . This can be equivalently rewritten as H in • f + P • H ρ = f + P • H ρ (by a trivial generalization of a result in [1] and [18] ), where f + P = λX.
Y f P (Y ) ⊆ X is the f P right adjoint. Note that in our context, f P is a denotational semantics, and therefore f + P is a weakest precondition semantics [6] . At this point, we are interested in transforming the semantics for completeness, and therefore for abstract non-interference, only in the cases where by transforming the semantics we can transform the input attacker model (abstract approach to the observer with η = id) or the confidential information we have to protect (blocking approach to the observable with φ = id). In both cases we have H in = H, but in the first case we have f P = P η while in the second one we have f P = P φ . At this point, note that by definition, the corresponding f + P are:
h, η(l) P (h, η(l)) ⊆ X wlp
The semantic transformation proposed in [17] can either reduce the semantics or enlarge it. In particular, in the context of abstract non-interference, in order to make ANI hold when it doesn't, the only meaningful transformation of wlp η is the one that reduces it. In fact, if non-interference fails, it means that we have two inputs that generate different outputs; hence, the only way to avoid this situation is to separate these inputs, namely to concretize η, and this can only happen if we reduce wlp η . As far as wlp φ is concerned, if abstract non-interference fails, it means that we are protecting too much for the given attacker, and therefore we have to weaken the protection policy abstracting the property we can protect; hence, the direction we can follow is to enlarge wlp φ . We denote by wlp ↓ η the closest map that restricts the images of wlp η , and by wlp φ ↑ the closest transformation that enlarges the images of wlp φ , i.e.,
Let us start by the transformation of wlp η , for which we need the following lemma, where we characterise the right adjoint of the abstract domain H.
Lemma 7.1 The right adjoint H + of H is
The next theorem characterises the minimal transformation of the semantics making abstract non-interference hold. Finally, we have to prove that there are no closer transformations of wlp. Consider a function W such that H • W • H ρ = W • H ρ and for each X we have W(X) ⊆ wlp η (X). We have to prove also that W(X) ⊆ wlp ↓ η (X); this is sufficient since the greatest lower bound of complete functions is complete [17] . We have again two cases:
1. If X / ∈ H ρ ∨ wlp η (X) ∈ H, the thesis is trivial; 2. If X ∈ H ρ ∧ wlp η (X) / ∈ H, then W(X) ⊆ wlp η (X) ⇒ H + (W(X)) ⊆ H + (wlp η (X)) (By monotonicity of This result tells us that the best concretization of the weakest precondition satisfying completeness for non-interference makes all the computations that violate non-interference impossible by setting to ∅ the corresponding inputs, and does nothing otherwise. This means that there are no significant concretizations of the input observation that make non-interference hold, when the output one is fixed. In other words, there cannot be meaningful transformations of the input attacker characterisation η that make ANI hold.
Let us see what happens for the transformation of the confidential information we want to protect. Consider the approximation from above of the function wlp φ . Finally, we have to prove that there are no closer transformations of wlp. Consider a function W such that H • W • H ρ = W • H ρ and for each X we have W(X) ⊇ wlp η (X). We have to prove also that W(X) ⊇ wlp φ ↑ (X); this is sufficient since the least upper bound of complete functions is complete [17] . We have again two cases:
1. If X / ∈ H ρ ∨ wlp φ (X) ∈ H, the thesis is trivial; 2. If X ∈ H ρ ∧ wlp φ (X) / ∈ H, then W(X) ⊇ wlp φ (X) ⇒ W(X) ⊇ wlp φ (H ρ (X)). On the other hand, X ∈ H ρ implies also that W(X) = W(H ρ (X)) = H • W • H ρ (X) by completeness, hence again being X ∈ H ρ we have W(X) = H • W(X). By what we showed above, this means that W(X) = H • W(X) ⊇ H • wlp φ (X) = wlp φ ↑ (X).
This result tells us that the best approximation from above of the weakest precondition semantics for inducing completeness adds all possible private inputs when non-interference is violated, and does nothing otherwise. This clearly implies that there are no significant approximations of the confidential information to protect that make non-interference hold, when the output one is fixed. Thus, the theorem above says that whenever ANI is violated we cannot protect private information by transforming the program code.
Conclusions
In this paper, we model (abstract) non-interference for language-based security by means of abstract domain completeness in abstract interpretation. The interest in this new formalisation is threefold: (i) we can prove that the derivations of the strongest output harmless attacker and of the maximal information disclosed are adjoint: the more the attacker observes, the less information we can keep secret; (ii) thanks to the completeness framework, we can conclude that these two policy transformations are the only interesting transformations [20] ; (iii) we can use a recent characterisation of semantic transformers for completeness [17] in order to show that it is not possible to meaningfully characterise the input minimal effort necessary for breaking security or the maximal information that can be kept secret with respect to a given attacker.
Recently, the framework of abstract non-interference has been extended to any computer science field where we are interested in understanding the interference degree between two classes of data (in security they were private and public) [16] . In this framework we have a new, more general, definition of abstract non-interference that we think still corresponds to completeness. The generalisation of this correspondence is interesting because it would allow us to export the knowledge about domain and semantics transformers to other fields of computer science related with non-interference, such as program slicing. Indeed, program slicing is strongly based on the notion of dependency which is the negation of non-interference, hence we can obtain an abstract version of program slicing starting from abstract non-interference [32] , and we think that the completeness formalisation can open new interesting challenges also in this direction.
